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Abstract  
This paper analyzes the relationship between public disclosure, private information and stock 
liquidity in the Tunisian market. We use a sample of 41 listed firms in the Tunis Stock 
Exchange in 2007. First, we find no evidence that there is a relation between public and 
private information. Second, Tunisian investors do not trust the information disclosed in both 
annual reports and web sites, consequently it has no effects on stock liquidity, in contrast with 
private information. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is commonly known that information asymmetry problems lead to the agency 
conflicts between managers and outside investors, which consequently decrease the volume 
and number of transactions in capital market (Akerlof, 1970). Voluntary disclosure of 
information has double role. First, it is a way to mitigate information asymmetry and 
consequently agency conflicts. In fact, investors use disclosed information to choose 
profitable projects. Second, even when the project is carried out, information disclosure deters 
also managers from opportunistic behavior. For example, they cannot take excessive risky 
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decisions to expropriate the investors’ wealth (Bushman and Smith, 2003). Moreover, Myers 
and Majluf (1984) argue that disclosure reduces agency costs and even the cost of outside 
financing (the pecking order theory). Since, “good” managers will be encouraged to disclose 
more voluntary information, which is, in turn, considered as a good signal of the quality of 
corporate governance (Chen et al., 2007).  
In the last years, corporate information disclosure has received considerable attention: 
many empirical studies argue that voluntarily disclosure in developed markets which are 
strongly regulated reduces capital cost3 and improves stock liquidity4. 
However, in emerging markets, empirical studies are divided and their results are not 
conclusive: Hassan et al. (2009), Wang et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2009) show that there is 
no significant effect of the corporate information disclosure neither on the firm’s value nor on 
financing cost (debt and equity). Gana and Chemli (2008) find that stock liquidity decreases 
with the level of information disclosure. However, Mattoussi et al. (2004) and Haddad et al. 
(2009) find a positive relationship between stock liquidity and disclosure level.  
Notice that the main source of information in these studies is the information publicly and 
voluntarily disclosed in annual reports. However, the firm’s information environment consists 
of public information disclosed in annual reports, web sites and conference calls, and private 
information disseminated through informed trading. 
Financial literature on information disclosure argues that public and private information are 
substitutes (Verrecchia, 1982 and Diamond, 1985) or complement (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991 
and McNichols and Trueman, 1994). 
In this paper, we raise the question: what is the impact of the informational 
environment on stock liquidity in the Tunisian market?  
To answer this question, we examine how Tunisian investors make investment 
decisions and if there is a relationship between public and private information. In contrast 
with Mattousi et al. (2004) and Gana and Chemli (2008) who were interested only in public 
information (disclosed in annual reports), we consider both public and private information in 
annual reports, web sites and order flows. 
In Tunisia, the law No 94-117 has fixed mandatory information, the conditions and the 
timing of disclosure. In addition, the Financial Market Council (CMF) set some rules about 
information disclosure and fixed the content of annual report. In 2008, the CMF reformed the 
content of the annual reports and presented a detailed reference model. However, it does not 
punish firms that did not publish mandatory information; consequently, firms are not 
constrained to disclose more information. 
 In this sense, Fitch Ratings (2009) argues that Tunisian market is poorly regulated. 
This is why it suffers from transparency problem. In the Doing Business reports5 over the 
period 2006-2009, the Tunisian market is assigned a disclosure index equal to 0.  
 The current study has three main results. First, find no relationship between between 
private information and the information voluntarily disclosed by firms. This finding implies 
that public information does not reduce adverse selection problems as signaling theory 
predicts.  
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Second, in contrast with prior Tunisian studies (Mattoussi and al., 2004; Gana and 
Chemli, 2008), we find that voluntary information disclosure in annual reports and on 
websites has no significant effect on stock liquidity. Our results show that information 
disclosure does not solve information asymmetry and that Tunisian investors do not rely on it 
to make their investment decisions. 
Third, it seems that Tunisian investors are overconfident: they rely only on their 
private information even when there is an arrival of new flow of information. They did not 
update their beliefs and traded aggressively (Daniel et al., 1998). This may decrease stock 
liquidity. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and provides hypothesis. The sample and the methodology are presented in Section 3. Section 
4 interprets and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Survey of the literature 
Adverse selection models (Bagehot, 1971; Kyle 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) 
are based on the assumption that market makers establish a large spread to minimize potential 
losses due to informed trading and simultaneously to maximize potential gains due to 
uninformed trading. Hence, adverse selection risk induces a high cost of transaction. 
Even under the absence of market makers, as in order-driven market, it is shown that 
adverse selection problems have effects on trading process and stock liquidity. Handa and 
Schwartz (1996) show that liquidity suppliers, who can be considered as market makers, 
prefer limit orders to compensate the losses of informed trading with the gains of uninformed 
trading. Later, Handa et al. (2003) find that high spread is explained by adverse selection 
problems. 
In order to diminish information asymmetry, traders substitute private information for 
public information. Collecting private information is too costly, which encourages them to 
rely only on the public information. This is supposed to improve the market conditions: 
homogenize investors’ opinions and reduce speculative positions (Verrecchia, 1982; 
Diamond, 1985). This is why more information disclosure is supposed to reduce information 
asymmetry, and therefore to improve stock liquidity and to reduce capital cost (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986, and Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Furthermore, Brown and Hillegeist 
(2007) point out that information disclosure improves the firm’s visibility.  
In contrast, the investors’ expectation, in terms of future public disclosures in pre-
announcement period, leads investors to collect more private information. Thus, public 
disclosures may lead to the increase of information asymmetry (Kim and Verrecchia 1991; 
McNichols and Trueman, 1994). 
Most of empirical studies were conducted on developed markets, particularly in the 
American market. They show that improving disclosure leads to a decrease of the spread 
(Welker, 1995; Healy et al. 1999; Heflin et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2007) and consequently the 
compensation of market makers. In such conditions, they noticed that many market makers 
leave their job because of the low quoted depth (Heflin et al., 2005). These results are also 
consistent with those of Brown and Hillegeist (2007), who find that the disclosure’s quality is 
negatively related to the level of information asymmetry.  
In other stock markets, Madrid stock exchange for example, Espinosa et al. (2008) 
join previous papers and highlight the positive relation between stock liquidity and disclosure 
level. In contrast, in Jordanian stock market, Haddad et al. (2009) highlight a negative relation 
between spread and disclosure level, but lower than in developed countries.  
Mattoussi et al. (2004) test the relationship between disclosure level and stock 
liquidity using a Tunisian data in 2001. Their results show that good disclosures diminish 
quoted spread and increase quoted depth. 
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Later, Gana and Chemli (2008) study the impact of disclosure level on spread using a 
sample of listed firms in the period 2001-2004. In contrast with Mattousi et al., they show a 
positive and significant effect of voluntary disclosure on spread. One explanation is that 
Tunisian investors have no confidence on the disclosed information in annual reports and do 
not use it to make their decisions.  
Thus, private information can increase adverse selection problems and lead 
consequently to a decrease of stock liquidity. Based on these findings, we state two 
hypotheses: 
H1: the level of private information disclosure is negatively related to stock liquidity. 
In addition, voluntary information disclosure may solve adverse selection problems 
and discourage collecting private information and improves stock liquidity. Consequently, we 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
H2: the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to stock liquidity. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
 
First, we consider common stocks of firms listed in the Tunisian Stock Exchange in 
2007. The initial sample contains 50 firms in both financial and non-financial sectors. Second, 
we eliminate stocks recently introduced in 2007 and non common ordinary stocks. Third, we 
exclude firms missing annual reports. Hence, 41 firms remain in our sample.  
Annual reports of these firms were collected through both the Financial Market 
Council (CMF) and personal visits to brokerage firms. In order to examine disclosure on 
websites, data were gathered from firms’ websites. 
For other variables, the data are provided by the Tunisian Stock Exchange and they 
contain daily trading data details (price, trading volume, best ask and best bid).  
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Table 1. Sample composition 
Initial sample  
Shares listed in 2007 50 
New listed shares 2 
Non common ordinary shares 2 
 
46 
Shares by industry  
Banks 10 
Other financial firms 11 
Services 7 
Manufacturing firms 18 
 
 
Annual reports not available 5 
Final sample 41 
 
3.2. Liquidity measure 
 
In contrast with prior empirical studies using one-dimensional liquidity measures such 
as spread and depth (Mattoussi et al. 2004; Gana and Chemli, 2008), we choose a 
multidimensional measure: the turnover-adjusted number of non trading days. According to 
Liu (2006), this measure captures three dimensions of liquidity: potential delay for executing 
an order, the cost and the quantity of transaction. The Liu’s measure is the standardized 
turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes which is supposed to be more 
appropriate to assess liquidity risk than average spread and illiquidity ratio of Amihud (2002) 
when the sample includes shares with high trading activity and shares with low trading 
activity. Indeed, the average spread and Amihud’s ratio cannot be calculated in non trading 
days, while Liu’measure includes the effect of non trading on liquidity risk. 
NoTDDeflator
TURNNoZVLIUM 2521 ×





+=  
where NoZR is the number of zero-volume trading days and NoTD is the total number of 
trading days in the market over the year. Because this number can vary from one year to 
another, the factor 
NoTD
252 is used to standardize it to 252 days (average number of trading days 
in one year) to make this measure comparable over time; Deflator6 is chosen arbitrary for all 
stocks, such that      
 
 
 
 
3.3. Voluntarily information disclosure level 
 
In order to measure the level of information publicly disclosed, previous studies 
advance that annual reports are more “informative” than short-term reports and other sources 
of information (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan 1997). However, these studies were 
conducted in developed economies and consequently cannot be generalized to emerging 
economies. 
We consider, in addition to annual reports, another information source: firms’ 
websites. To our knowledge there are no empirical studies on the relationship between stock 
liquidity and information published in websites in both emerging and developed markets. 
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For this reason, we establish two indexes. The first one is an extension of the index of 
Botosan (1997). This index assesses the volume of information voluntarily published by firms 
in annual reports. Items of this index reflect five types of information: 1) background 
information (management’s objectives, business strategy, principal products, etc.);                      
2) historical summaries of annual financial results; 3) non-financial information such as 
market share and average compensation per employee; 4) forecasted information such as 
forecast of profits and forecast of cash flows, and 5) management discussion and analysis that 
include year-to-year changes that is not recoverable from financial statement. 
This index, initially constructed for non financial American firms, was adapted by 
Mattoussi et al. (2004) in financial sector. In this paper, we readjusted this index according to 
the regulation of the Financial Market Council Tunisian. We construct another index to 
evaluate the level of information extracted from the firms’ websites.  
Voluntary information disclosure is beyond required disclosure. This kind of 
disclosure is encouraged but is not subject to special requirements. Disclosure level, referring 
to the volume and the quality of information, is difficult to assess since it cannot be measured 
directly (Cooke and Wallace, 1989). 
In prior studies7 on voluntary disclosure, two categories of disclosure index are used. 
The first one is published by specialized agencies, like Corporate Information Committee of 
the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF), the Association of Investment Management and 
Research Corporation Information Committee (AIMR) and Standard & Poor's (S&P). This 
category of indexes contains all the information provided by firms (annual, quarterly, 
semester, half-yearly and other written information and investors’ relations). However, these 
agencies are dealing only with large firms. The second category measures the level of 
disclosure on annual reports (Botosan, 1997; Eng and Mak, 2003; Wang et al. 2008). These 
indexes depend significantly on subjective criteria, for example the researcher’s judgment 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
Inspired by their indexes, we constructed two indexes to evaluate information 
voluntarily published on annual reports and on firms’ websites because of the absence of such 
agencies in Tunisia. 
 
Disclosure level in annual reports (BOTS) 
 
The first step consists in fixing preliminary information items that firms may disclose 
voluntarily. To do this, first, we review disclosure index used by prior studies. We focus in 
this study, in particular, on the index of Botosan (1997). 
Botosan (1997) choose items included in the index according to the recommendations 
provided in the Jenkins report (AICPA, 1995). The Botosan’ scoring procedure consists on 
assigning one point for qualitative information and an additional point for quantitative 
information. The score is the total points awarded to firm divided by the highest score. 
This index, constructed for US firms, has proved his validity as a measure of 
disclosure extent. Later, many researchers construct their own indexes based upon this index 
for different institutional setting, such as: Gul and Leung (2004) for Hong Kong listed firms; 
Patelli and Prencipe (2007) for Italians firms; Alsaeed (2006) for Saudi firms, Mattoussi et al. 
(2004) and Gana and Chemli (2008) for Tunisian firms. 
 
The second step is to adapt these items to Tunisian firms. We compare preliminary 
items with required elements according to the Financial Market Council’s regulation (CMF). 
Particularly, the adjustment of the index is focused on the category of information: historical 
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financial results. According to the CMF’s regulation, the firm must publish the evolution of 
its performance over the past 5 years. Thus, beyond the past 5 years, the information 
disclosure is voluntary. However, indexes used in previous studies set the threshold of 2 years 
(Mattoussi et al., 2004; Gana and Chemli, 2008). 
 
In the third step, we adjust our index to disclosure practice followed by Tunisian firms. 
We apply items list to annual reports to exclude irrelevant items, such as: 1) not disclosed by 
any firm and 2) disclosed by all firms. 
Our final index includes 36 items: general information (12 items); summary of 
historical financial results (3 items), non-financial information (5 items), forecasting 
information (7 items) and analysis and discussion of the management (9 items).  
The final step is to test the reliability of this constructed index. For this we use 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha that is commonly used to assess the internal consistency.  
Cronbach’s coefficient indicates that the disclosure index shows a satisfactory internal 
consistency (Cronbach Alpha = 0,650). 
 
 Disclosure level in firm’ websites (SWEB) 
 
Information Disclosure using Internet has become a common practice in many 
companies. It is a way among others to reduce disclosure’s costs (Healy and Palepu, 2001). It 
provides valuable information to investors who would like to invest in the firm. The corporate 
governance’s principles of the OECD (2004) and the guide of good governance practices in 
Tunisian companies (2008) encourage the use of the Internet as a means to reveal information. 
 
We scrutinize websites to identify the main information, which is supposed to be 
helpful in making decision process. We retain six kinds of information:  financial information 
not included in the annual report, availability of downloadable annual report, availability of 
downloadable annual reports of previous years, access to press releases; access to press 
articles such as interviews with CEO (some press articles are downloadable) and availability 
of corporate governance data. This helps us to assign an index to each website.   
 
Table 2. Frequency of items identified in Tunisian firms’ site web 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Existence of a website 31 67% 
Financial information 9 19% 
Availability of annual report 10 22% 
Availability of annual reports of previous years 5 11% 
Access to press releases 6 13% 
Access press articles 2 43% 
Availability of governance data  6 13% 
 
 
Only 67% of our firms have web sites, such as Amen bank, ASSAD, BIAT and 
TUNISAIR. Their web sites contain annual report of the current year and the financial 
information not included in the annual report. However, information element, less available, 
is press articles. It seems that the disclosed information in the firms’ websites is not useful for 
investors and the firms’ shareholders, but it is addressed to customers and suppliers.  
Scoring procedure consists to assign one point for each available item. The web index 
is the sum of points attributed divided by the maximum index (7 points).  
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Test of its reliability reveal a good internal consistency (Cronbach Alpha = 0,738). 
 
3.4. Private information production 
 
We use the percentage of informed trading as a measure of private information 
production, the average absolute value of imbalance order (AIMO). Easley et al. (1996) argue 
that uninformed investors submit buying and selling orders with equal probabilities. However, 
informed ones submit more purchase orders if they receive positive information signal and 
more sales orders if they receive negative information signal. Therefore, the difference 
between the two kinds of orders measures the information asymmetry.  
Hmaied et al. (2006) find that Tunisian investors have different behavior. In fact, 
buyers use private information to decide in contrast with sellers who use only public 
information. Thus, they conclude that buyers submit more orders than sellers.  
According to Aktas et al. (2007), the probability of informed trading AIMO can be 
measured by: 
( ) ( )QSQBQSQBAIMO +−=
 
where QB and QS represent respectively demand quantity and offer quantity. 
3.5. Control variables 
In the current study, we retain the following control variables: volatility (VLAT), firm 
size (SIZE), and book to market ratio (BTMK).   
To measure stock return volatility, we use the standard deviation of daily returns. It 
captures total risk of stocks. Most of the studies8 find that stocks with high volatility are 
riskier and consequently less liquid. In contrast, Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988) advance that volatility is positively associated with stock liquidity. Indeed, informed 
traders attempt to hide their trading among transactions of liquidity traders’ transactions, 
leading to a more volatile market and more liquid one.  Hence, an increase of volatility 
increases the liquidity in the market.   
Merton (1987), Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that 
the firm size, defined by logarithm of the firm’s capitalization, increases with stock market 
liquidity.     
According to Fama and French (1993), book to market ratio captures the firm’s risk, 
and investors ask for high premium to compensate them for the risk of holding their stocks. 
This is why, we include book to market ratio in order to control the effect of firm risk on 
stock liquidity. 
 
Table 3. Definition of variables 
Variables Abbreviations Indicators Expected 
signs 
Liquidity LIUM The standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily 
trading volumes 
 
Characteristics 
of information 
environment 
BOTS Botosan (1997) index modified (+) 
SWEB Site web index (+) 
AIMO The average absolute value of imbalance order (-) 
Control 
variables 
SIZE Market value of  equity (+) 
BTMK A ratio of the book value of a assets to its market value (-) 
VLAT Standard deviation of the daily stock returns (-) 
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4. Empirical findings and discussions  
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The table 4 reports descriptive statistics: stock liquidity, the characteristics of 
information environment and control variables.  
The Panel A shows that potential delay in executing an order is on average 56 days. 
There is a big deviation for this variable (67 days), which implies that our sample includes 
high and low frequently traded stocks. In addition, we notice that the parameter of the firm’s 
size is on average 129 millions (Ms) of TND9, which varies between 6 Ms TND and 784 Ms 
TND. One explanation of the high dispersion of the firm’s size is that our sample contains 10 
of the largest firms10 (66% of market share).  
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
A. descriptive statistics of liquidity and other stock characteristics 
 LIUM BTMK 
 
SIZE 
(MD) 
VLAT 
N 46 46 46 46 
Mean 56.791 0.800 129 0.032 
Median 26.313 0.815 52 0.015 
Std. Deviation 68.987 0.292 174 0.046 
Skewness 1.477 0.720 2.323 2.741 
Kurtosis 1.266 2.680 5.761 7.445 
Minimum 0.001 0.256 6 0.005 
Maximum 243.067 1.800 784 0.223 
Legend: 
BTMK=book-to-market ratio; SIZE= market capitalisation; VLAT=standard deviation 
daily returns; LIUM= standardised turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volume; 
 
B. Descriptive statistics of information environment 
  IGEN HIST INFI PREV GEST BOTS SWEB AIMO 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 46 46 
Mean 0.089 0.004 0.038 0.026 0.079 0.222 0.211 46.342 
Median 0.080 0.000 0.043 0.022 0.087 0.217 0.143 40.073 
Standard deviation 0.027 0.011 0.023 0.029 0.032 0.058 0.225 18.562 
Skewness 1.486 2.951 -0.310 0.880 -0.361 0.391 1.150 14.48 
Kurtosis 2.119 8.052 -0.532 -0.089 -0.510 0.303 0.684 15.07 
Minimum 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.000 25.158 
Maximum 0.174 0.043 0.087 0.109 0.130 0.348 0.857 99.998 
Legend  
IGEN= General information; HIST= summary historical financial results; INFI= non financial information; PREV=forecasting information; 
MANG= analysis and discussion of the management; BOTS= disclosure index of annual reports; SWEB =website disclosure index; AIMO= 
absolute value of imbalance order. 
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  The average stock return volatility is high (3%) and it varies between 22.3% and 
0.5%. The ratio of book to market is on average 80%, which implies that stocks are 
overvalued. 
Statistics indicates that the average percentage of informed trading, which captures 
private information, is high (46%) and may reach a maximum level of 99%.  
The average disclosure index of annual reports is 22.2%, and varies between 10.3% 
and 34.8%. Its average deviation is 5.8%. This means that the level of information disclosure 
does not vary significantly among Tunisian firms. They prefer reporting voluntarily more 
information related to management objectives, business strategy and the change of 
management activity, and little financial and forecasting information. The disclosure index on 
web sites is on average 21.1% and its deviation is 22.5%, which suggests that the content of 
web sites varies significantly from one firm to another: (1) 15 firms have no sites, (2) 14 firms 
use websites as customer interface and do not disclose any information to investors11, and (3) 
17 firms disclose useful information for investors. 
 
4.2. Correlation analysis 
 
Table 5 reports that liquidity depends neither on voluntary disclosure on annual reports 
nor on websites. In contrast, the percentage of informed trading is positively correlated with 
the timing of executing an order. This implies that stock liquidity is decreasing with private 
information.  
The information environment proxies (disclosure index on annual reports, disclosure 
index on web sites and imbalance order) are not correlated between them, which is not 
consistent with the assumption that private and public information are not related.  
 
 
Table 5. Spearman's correlation between informational environment of firms and control variables 
  BOTS SWEB AIMO LIUM BTMK VLAT SIZE 
BOTS 1,000       
SWEB 0.071 1,000      
AIMO 0.029 -0.022 1,000     
LIUM -0.077 -0.226 0.829** 1,000    
BTMK -0.127 0.163 -0.013 -0.056 1,000   
VLAT -0.079 0.043 -0.201 -0.162 0.013 1,000  
SIZE   0.071      0.421** -0.264  -0.406** -0.271 -0.176 1,000 
Legend: 
BTMK=book-to-market ratio; SIZE= market capitalization; VLAT=standard deviation daily returns; LIUM= standardized turnover-adjusted 
number of zero daily trading volume; BOTS= disclosure index on annual reports; SWEB= disclosure index on website; AIMO=absolute 
value of imbalance order.*. **: statistically significant for the threshold values of 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
In fact, the policy of Tunisian firms in terms of corporate information disclosure does 
not add valuable information to investors; consequently, they do not rely on such information 
to make decisions. One explanation is that usually Tunisian investors did not rely on disclosed 
information: they prefer traditional ways to collect the information they need. Indeed, Dellagi 
et al. (2001) advance that Tunisians invest based on information provided by friends and 
relatives. Some of them are suspicious and do not trust these reports. 
We notice a positive correlation between web sites disclosure and the firm’s size. This 
result shows that only the largest firms, particularly banks, disclose information through their 
websites. 
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4.3. Regression analysis 
 
Hereafter, we test the following model to study the relation between the stock liquidity 
and the variables describing the informational environment of the firm. 
 
iiiiiiii SIZEBTMKVLATSWEBBOTSAIMOLIUM εδδδδδδδ +++++++= 6543210  
 
Table 6. Relationship between firms’ information environment and stock liquidity 
              LIUM 
AIMO 3.296 
  
(6.73)** 
BOTS -89.922 
  
(0.98) 
SWEB -39.697 
  
(1.92) 
VLAT 1.296 
  
(0.24) 
SIZE -2.430 
  
(0.55) 
BTMK 28.667 
  
(1.39) 
Constant -40.623 
  
(0.44) 
Observations 41 
Adjusted R2  0.79 
Legend 
BOTS= disclosure index on annual reports; SWEB= disclosure index on website; 
AIMO=absolute value of imbalance order; BTMK=book-to-market ratio; SIZE= market 
capitalization; VLAT=standard deviation daily returns. 
*, **: statistically significant for the threshold values of 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
The model’s estimation enables us to retain the hypothesis H1 and reject the 
hypothesis H2. Indeed, we report a positive effect of percentage of informed trading on Liu 
measure. Accordingly, private information increases adverse selection risk and consequently 
reduces stock liquidity. 
In addition, we show that the level of information disclosure, proxied by Botosan 
index has no effect on liquidity. This result is similar to that of Hassan et al. (2009), who find 
no effect of voluntary information disclosure on Egyptian firms’ value.  
The current study provides slight different results from previous empirical studies on 
Tunisian context of Gana and Chemli (2008) and Mattoussi et al. (2004). The latter study 
demonstrates that information voluntarily disclosed in annual reports reduces information 
asymmetry and improves stock liquidity, while the first one finds the opposite effect.  
One explanation of their different findings is the use of different research method. They 
examine different periods using dynamic and static approaches. 
In contrast with the indexes they used, we constructed a new index adapted to the Tunisian 
framework. Indeed, we have excluded from the Botosan (1997) index used by Mattoussi et al. 
(2004) and Gana and Chemli (2008) some items that we consider as mandatory items. Hence, 
the significant effect of disclosure level on stock liquidity reported in previous studies may be 
due to mandatory elements included in indexes. 
Therefore, the disclosed information is not too useful and valuable for the Tunisian 
investors to make their decisions. This information is disclosed only for respecting the 
regulation and still limited. Indeed, the disclosed information in annual reports is too standard 
in the sense that all the Tunisian firms provide the same information. 
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Our results provide strong evidence that there is no valuable information disclosed in 
web sites. Accordingly, we deduce that the information disseminated via the Internet is not 
considered as a source of information for Tunisian investors.  
We conclude that voluntary disclosure does not enable us to mitigate information 
asymmetry. Indeed, in Tunisia as in other Arabic countries (for example Egypt and Jordan), 
firms do not disclose enough information to investors because of social and cultural 
characteristics, such as tendency towards secrecy (Hassan et al. 2006; Haddad et al., 2009).  
For instance, investors do not rely on the firm to obtain the information they need but 
prefer gathering and collecting private information themselves. Consequently, adverse 
selection risk increases significantly and discourages liquidity traders to negotiate, which 
decreases stock liquidity.  
Moreover, we can explain the decisions of Tunisian investors by psychological biases. 
According to Daniel et al. (1998), investors’ overconfidence bias leads to overreaction in the 
market. Hence, investors’ response to public information is limited. The adjustment of 
investors’ decision is too little even if public information contradicts their private information.  
Indeed, the survey of Zaiane and Abaoub (2010) confirms that Tunisian investors are 
overconfident. They find that 66.4% of respondents have confidence in their intuitions while 
32,4% of respondents hold their stocks less than three months. This leads overconfident 
investors to trade aggressively. Their results show that 55.2% of respondents use more than 
one source of information (Internet, newspapers and advice of brokers) because they think 
that they will never get all the hidden information. Hence, they conclude that Tunisian 
investors overestimate the quality of information and their ability to interpret it. 
 
5.4. Robustness tests 
 
5.4.1. Bootstrap approach 
 
In small samples, a bootstrap approach might be preferred. This approach consists on 
simulating new samples obtained by sampling with replacement from the original sample. 
Results given by this approach are the same found with OLS regression. Hence, we confirm 
the robustness of previous results.   
 
5.4.2. Other liquidity proxies 
To check for robustness of results, we replace the Liu’s measure with other liquidity 
measures. We test whether the previous results depend on the choice of liquidity measures or 
not. We have two sets of measures capturing two liquidity dimensions: cost and quantity. 
For assessing the cost of transaction, we rely on 1) bid ask spread (BASQ) frequently 
used in prior studies12 as a measure of immediat cost; 2) Amihud illiquidity ratio (ILIQ) 
which captures the price impact13  ; and 3) the proportion of zero returns (PZER) which 
represents  the total cost of transaction14. 
In order to measure the transaction volume, we introduce two measures: 1) turnover 
ratio (TURN) reflecting trading frequency; and 2) market depth15 (DEPH) employed as a 
measure of transaction volume. The following table presents the robustness results.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Mattoussi et al. (2004); Gana and Chemli (2008) and Haddad et al. (2009). 
13
 Espinosa et al. (2008). 
14
 Lesmond et al. (1999). 
15
 Mattoussi et al. (2004). 
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Table 7. Relationship between firms’ information environment and other liquidity proxies 
 BASQ PZER ILIQ DEPH TURN 
AIMO 0.021 1.115 0.057 -0.019 -0.064 
 (2.02) (8.43)** (4.17)** (3.85)** (3.82)** 
BOTS 
-3.441 -42.930 0.666 4.271 0.291 
 (1.50) (1.25) (0.19) (3.26)** (0.08) 
SWEB 
-0.589 -11.544 -0.336 0.232 0.951 
 (1.50) (1.19) (0.52) (0.63) (1.18) 
VLAT 
-0.032 -0.371 0.289 0.208 -0.129 
 (0.29) (0.14) (1.48) (2.08)* (0.59) 
SIZE 
-0.208 -0.314 -0.699 0.016 -0.378 
 (2.41)* (0.16) (5.57)** (0.22) (2.62)* 
BTMK 0.403 14.070 1.034 0.897 -1.507 
 (0.70) (1.89) (1.52) (3.18)** (1.70) 
Constant 3.918 -2.928 11.805 5.909 6.745 
 (1.87) (0.07) (4.66)** (3.95)** (2.22)* 
Observations 41 41 41 41 41 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.75 0.71 0.60 0.47 
Legend 
BTMK=book-to-market ratio; SIZE= market capitalization; VLAT=standard deviation daily returns; LIUM= standardised turnover-
adjusted number of zero daily trading volume; BOTS= disclosure index on annual reports; SWEB= disclosure index on website; 
AIMO=absolute value of imbalance order. 
*, **: statistically significant for the threshold values of 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Results show that voluntary information disclosure has no effect on transaction cost. 
Hence, corporate disclosure is not enough to diminish asymmetric information and to improve 
stock liquidity. In contrast, we detect positive and significant effect of private information on 
the measures of cost of transaction. Indeed, when there is an arrival of large number of 
informed investors into the market, information asymmetry is more severe, consequently the 
cost of transaction increases. These results indicate the robustness of those found using Liu’s 
measure. 
Moreover, private information reduces the frequency of activity and market depth. In 
addition, we report that public information published in annual reports improves the market 
depth. These results indicate that information voluntarily disclosed (BOTS) improves the 
absorption of shares without affecting both frequency and cost of transaction. These results 
confirm also, that the Tunisian investors do not consider public information disseminated by 
the company when they measure transaction cost.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we raised the question of the effect of informational environment of the 
firm on stock liquidity in Tunisian market, which includes information voluntarily disclosed 
and private information. Our results show that there is no relationship between private and 
public information. We find also that only private information influences stock liquidity, and 
that Tunisian investors do not rely only on information voluntarily disclosed in annual reports 
and firms’ websites.  
Contrary to previous empirical findings in emerging market (Mattoussi et al. 2004; 
Haddad et al., 2009), our study does not support the signaling theory predictions but confirms 
the predictions of behavioral finance theory.  
These results may help also to understand the informational environment of Tunisian 
listed firms. Despite the Tunisian regulation’s efforts made to improve the firms’ 
transparency, this is not enough to constrain Tunisian firms to disclose more information and 
to discourage private information collection. 
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 In fact, Tunisian regulators need to incite Tunisian listed companies to disclose more 
information voluntarily by fiscal advantages and subventions. In addition, the CMF should 
control the information disseminated and impose penalties for nondisclosure of mandatory 
information (other than financial statement) in annual report.  
Our study presents some limitations. First, we consider a static approach since we 
consider only firms listed in 2007. Second, we have neglected other sources of information, 
such as meetings with financial analysts and media representatives. Indeed, this practice has 
been increasingly adopted by the Tunisian firms as a means of voluntary disclosure, 
particularly following the outbreak of the global financial crisis.  
In 2008, 20 listed companies held 31 meetings with analysts, 17 of which were held 
during the market downturn because of the financial crisis16. Some companies have held more 
than one meeting in 2008, for example, Alkimia has organized 4 meetings. Thus, it would be 
interesting to see the effect of this new communication means on the behavior of Tunisian 
investors in future study. 
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